We outline a framework for causal inference in settings where assignment to a binary treatment is ignorable, but compliance with the assignment is not perfect so that the receipt of treatment is nonignorable. To address the problems associated with comparing subjects by the ignorable assignment-an "intention-to-treat analysis"-we make use of instrumental variables, which have long been used by economists in the context of regression models with constant treatment effects. We show that the instrumental variables (IV) estimand can be embedded within the Rubin Causal Model (RCM) and that under some simple and easily interpretable assumptions, the IV estimand is the average causal effect for a subgroup of units, the compliers. Without these assumptions, the IV estimand is simply the ratio of intention-to-treat causal estimands with no interpretation as an average causal effect. The advantages of embedding the IV approach in the RCM are that it clarifies the nature of critical assumptions needed for a causal interpretation, and moreover allows us to consider sensitivity of the results to deviations from key assumptions in a straightforward manner. We apply our analysis to estimate the effect of veteran status in the Vietnam era on mortality, using the lottery number that assigned priority for the draft as an instrument, and we use our results to investigate the sensitivity of the conclusions to critical assumptions.
INTRODUCTION
Economists are typically interested in estimating causal effects rather than mere associations between variables. Potentially interesting causal effects include the effects of education on employment and earnings, the effects of employment training programs on subsequent labor market histories, and the effects of a firm's inputs on its output. The dominant approach to making inferences about causal effects in economics over the last four decades is based on structural equation models, which rely on the specification of systems of equations with parameters and variables that attempt to capture behavioral relationships and specify the causal links between variables. Goldberger (1972) and Morgan (1990) provided historical perspectives on these models, which date back to Wright (1928 Wright ( , 1934 and Haavelmo (1943 Haavelmo ( , 1944 . Inference in structural equation models often exploits the presence of instrumental variables (IV). These are variables that are explicitly excluded from some equations and included in others, and therefore correlated with some outcomes only through their effect on other variables.
Rather than relying on structural equation models, causal inference in statistics, going back at least to work by Fisher (1918, 1925) and Neyman (1923) on agricultural experiments, is fundamentally based on the randomized experiment (see also Kempthorne 1952 and Cox 1958) . The basic notion in this formulation, which has been extended by Rubin (1974 Rubin ( , 1978 to more complicated situations, including observational studies without randomization, is that of potential outcomes. The causal effect of a treatment on a IV procedures rely on judgments regarding the correlation between functional-form-specific disturbances and instruments. In contrast, our approach forces the researcher to consider the effect of exposing units to specific treatments. If it is not possible (or not plausible) to envision the alternative treatments underlying these assumptions, the use of these techniques may well be inappropriate. Moreover, by separating and defining the critical assumptions, our formulation allows for a clear assessment of the consequences of violations of these assumptions through sensitivity analysis under more general models. Our main results are summarized in three propositions: the first provides conditions for a causal interpretation of the IV estimand, and the others reveal the consequences of violations of the critical assumptions.
We develop our presentation in the context of an evaluation of the effect of serving in the military on health outcomes. Data for this study come from the Vietnam era, when priority for conscription was randomly allocated through the draft lottery. For expository purposes, and to be precise without cumbersome notation, we use the simplest possible example: both the "treatment" (i.e., serving in the military or not, denoted by D) and the "assignment" (1995) . Moreover, the generalization to cases with covariates is, in principle, immediate by applying our results at distinct values of the covariates. Also, fully principled methods of estimation using likelihood-based or Bayesian techniques can be derived as in Imbens and Rubin (1994a) .
In Section 2 we briefly describe the structural equation approach to causal inference in economics. In Section 3 we develop an alternative approach based on the RCM, and the approaches are contrasted in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss how to evaluate the sensitivity of the IV estimand to two of the critical assumptions presented in Section 3. In Section 6 we apply this approach to our draft lottery example, where we formulate the critical assumptions in the RCM framework and investigate the implications of violations of these assumptions.
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS IN ECONOMICS
Following Goldberger (1972), we define structural equation models as "stochastic models in which each equation represents a causal link, rather than a mere empirical association" (p. 979). Such models are widely used in economics, going back to work by Wright (1928 Wright ( , 1934 , Schultz (1928) , and Haavelmo (1943, 1944) 
The assumption that the correlation between E and Zi is zero and the absence of Z in Equation (1) captures the notion that any effect of Z on Y must be through an effect of Z on D. This is a key assumption in econometric applications of instrumental variables. A second assumption is that the covariance between the treatment Di and assignment Z2 differs from zero; that is, cov(Di, Zi) 34 ?,
which can be interpreted as requiring that a,i differ from zero. If Zi satisfies these two assumptions, then it is considered an IV in this model. In general Di, the endogenous regressor in econometric terminology, is potentially correlated with Ei because the two disturbances Ei and vi are potentially correlated. This implies that the receipt of treatment Di is not ignorable (Rubin 1978) and, in econometric terminology, not exogenous. For this simple example, the IV estimator is defined as the ratio of sample covariances (Durbin 1954) tential outcomes used here can be viewed as analogous to Neyman's (1923) notion of "potential yields" in randomized agricultural experiments, as extended by Rubin (1974 Rubin ( , 1978 Rubin ( , 1990 Rubin ( , 1991 to observational studies where the potential outcomes are partially revealed by a general treatment assignment mechanism, to situations with possible variation of treatments and with possible interference between units, and to Bayesian and likelihood inference where the potential outcomes and assignment have a joint probability distribution. As originally formulated, the potential outcomes Di(Z) and Y (Z, D) are fixed but unknown values partially observed through the assignment of treatments to units. Differences in these potential outcomes due to assigned and received treatments will be revealed by analyzing data obtained by randomly assigning Z in the finite population of N units under study. Our initial goal is to provide inferences solely about this finite population.
In evaluation research, some assumptions about how units interact and the variety of possible treatments are required. Our notation has already restricted both Z and D to have only two levels; that is, there is no partial compliance. Here we follow the convention in statistics and medical research by assuming no interference between units.
Given SUTVA and random assignment, unbiased estimators for the average intention-to-treat effects can be obtained by taking the difference of sample averages of Y and D classified by the value of Z; that is, by treatmentcontrol mean differences. This has been well known since at least Neyman (1923) The ratio of (7) and (8) equals the conventional instrumental variables estimator (6). The limit of the IV estimator (i.e., the IV estimand), therefore equals the ratio of average intention-to-treat effects.
Instrumental Variables
The critical feature of the problem of evaluating a treatment under imperfect compliance is that even if assignment Zi is random or ignorable, the actual receipt of treatment Di is typically nonignorable. Therefore the difference of outcome averages by treatment received does not provide an unbiased or even consistent estimate of the average causal effect of D on Y. In fact, we require additional assumptions just to define the causal effect of D on Y in a meaningful way. The following assumption requires the treatment assignment to be unrelated to potential outcomes once treatment received is taken into account. We now have notation for the causal effects of interest. The next assumption requires Z to have some effect on the average probability of treatment. to as a never-taker; or in our application, a draft avoider; whereas if Di (O) = Di (1) = 1, the individual is an alwaystaker or, in our application, a volunteer. Finally, individuals with Di (1) -Di (0) = -1 (top right) do the opposite of their assignment; they are induced to avoid the treatment by assignment to it, and induced to take the treatment by assignment to the control group. We call such individuals defiers, as suggested by Balke and Pearl (1993) in a comment on an earlier version of this paper (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1993). The causal effect of Z on Y for these individuals is Yi(O) -Yi(l). Finally, we refer to never-takers, alwaystakers, and defiers jointly as noncompliers. Note that these labels-compliers, defiers, never-takers, always-takers, and noncompliers-are simply definitions given SUTVA in this experiment and are not assumptions about individual behavior.
By virtue of the exclusion restriction, the two subpopulations corresponding to the two diagonal elements of Table  1 are characterized by a zero causal effect of Z on Y. By virtue of the monotonicity assumption there are no defiers, and the group corresponding to the top-right element in the table is empty. Finally, by virtue of Assumption 4, the proportion of the population in the cell corresponding to compliers differs from zero and is equal to the average causal effect of Z on D. Combined, these assumptions imply that the average causal effect of Z on Y is proportional to the average causal effect of D on Y for compliers. This is the result in Proposition 1.
Because we can estimate the two intention-to-treat estimands by virtue of random assignment, we can also estimate their ratio; that is, the IV estimand. The ratio of the usual unbiased estimators for the intention-to-treat estimands given in (7) and (8) is equal to the standard instrumental variables estimator for binary instruments given in (6). This estimator does not exploit all the implications of the model developed in this section. In Imbens and Rubin (1994a,b) we discuss implications of this model for estimation.
Finally, it is important to note that (under our assumptions) we cannot generally identify the specific members of the group of compliers, defined by Di(O) = 0, Di(1) = 1, for whom we can identify the average treatment effect. Thus, the local average treatment effect (i.e., the average causal effect for compliers) is not the average treatment effect for either the entire population or for a subpopulation identifiable from observed values. Stronger assumptions are needed for the identification of average causal effects for subpopulations identifiable from observed data. One assumption that achieves this is random assignment to a control group denied treatment, so that Di ( 
COMPARING THE STRUCTURAL EQUATION AND POTENTIAL OUTCOMES FRAMEWORK
In Section 2 we described a structural equation model for the effect of military service on a health outcome using an indicator of draft eligibility as an instrument. Here we contrast that framework with the approach developed for the same problem in Section 3. In particular, we compare the formulation and clarity of the assumptions in each case. This comparison is useful because several authors have attributed the absence of structural equation methods in statistics to the manner in which such models are commonly formulated. For example, in his discussion of the connection between structural equation methods and path analysis, Goldberger (1972) 
The Exclusion Restriction and Ignorable Treatment Assignment
The econometric version of these assumptions requires that the disturbances in the response equation (1) and the participation equation (2) be uncorrelated with, or independent of, the assignment Z. In Imbens and Angrist (1994) this assumption is formulated in a framework using potential outcomes indexed only against the level of the treatment D. The framework we develop here separates this requirement into two assumptions about potentially observable quantities: the exclusion restriction, which says nothing about the treatment assignment mechanism, and ignorable treatment assignment, which says nothing about possible direct effects of assignment.
First, the exclusion restriction requires that the instrument have no effect on the outcome except through D. Thus to verify this assumption, the researcher must consider, at the unit level, the effect of changing the value of the instrument while holding the value-of the treatment fixed. To clarify the distinction between this formulation and the econometric formulation, consider the four subpopulations defined by the values of Di(O) and Di(1) in Table 1 . Someone with Di (0) = Di (1) = 1 would always serve in the military with a low or high draft lottery number. It seems reasonable to assume that for such a person, the draft lottery number has no effect on health outcome. Next, consider someone with Di(O) = Di(I) = 0, who would have managed to avoid military service with a high or low lottery number. For someone exempted from military service for medical reasons, it seems plausible that there was no effect of the draft lottery number. But a draftee who managed to avoid military service by staying in school or moving abroad could experience an effect of Z on future life outcomes that would violate the exclusion restriction. For both these groups of noncompliers, the exclusion restriction requires the researcher to consider a difference in outcomes that were potentially observable, even though after the population was randomly allocated to treatment and control groups, only one of the outcomes was actually observed. In fact, if one could identify compliers and noncompliers, then it would be possible to test the exclusion restriction by comparing average outcomes for noncompliers by assignment status.
For compliers with Di(0) = 0, Di(1) = 1, the exclusion restriction compares outcomes that cannot be observed: it requires that Yi(0, Di(0)) = Yi(1, Di(0)) and Yi(I, Di(1)) = Yi(O, Di(1)). For this group, the exclusion restriction amounts to attributing the effect of Z on Y to the change in the treatment received D rather than to the change in assignment Z. Such an assumption is not innocuous, and efforts to ensure it form the rationale for blinding, double blinding, and using placebos in clinical trials. Nevertheless, it underlies most experimental evaluations in economics where blinding and placebos are impossible, and is often thought to be reasonable in those cases.
The second element embedded in the assumption of zero correlation between instruments and disturbances in the standard econometric formulation is that of random, or at least ignorable, treatment assignment Z. This assumption is trivially satisfied if physical randomization took place, as in the application in Section 6 where Z is a function of a lottery number. Our formulation makes clear that randomization of the instrument, though sufficient to allow unbiased estimation of the average treatment effect of Z on Y and of the average treatment effect of Z on D, does not imply that the IV estimand is interpretable as an average causal effect. In most applications of IV, however, the instrument is not randomly assigned, and this assumption must be argued more carefully. Examples include Angrist and Krueger's (1991) use of quarter of birth as an instrument for the effect of schooling on earnings, Card's (1993) use of distance to college as an instrument for the effect of schooling on earnings, and McClellan and Newhouse's (1994) use of relative distance to hospital as an instrument for the effect of catherization on mortality after acute myocardial infarction.
Whereas the exclusion restriction requires the researcher to contemplate the effect of specific treatments on outcomes, the ignorability assumption requires consideration of the assignment mechanism. Violations of these different assumptions can have different sources and consequences. In our view, pooling these assumptions into the single assumption of zero correlation between instruments and disturbances has led to confusion about the essence of the identifying assumptions and hinders assessment and communication of the plausibility of the underlying model.
The Monotonicity Condition
The monotonicity assumption rules out the existence of defiers, characterized by Di(0) = 1 and Di(1) = 0. Permutt and Hebel (1989) informally discussed a variant of this assumption in a reanalysis of a program designed to induce pregnant women to stop smoking. In that context, the assumption implies that everyone who would stop smoking if they were in the control group, which received no encouragement to stop smoking, would also stop smoking if encouraged to do so by being in the treatment group. Robins (1989) discussed the effect of this assumption on bounds on population average treatment effects. Monotonicity is implied by designs where those assigned to the control group are prevented from receiving the treatment, as in Zelen's (1979) single-consent designs.
Monotonicity has no explicit counterpart in the econometric formulation, but is implicit in the use of an equation with constant parameters for the relation between Zi and Di. The model developed in Section 3 suggests that the constant parameter assumption embodied in (2) is much stronger than needed. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to postulate a nonzero covariance between treatment and assignment, as in (5), for the interpretation of the IV estimand as an average of causal effects.
Reduced Form and Structural Parameters
Reduced-form parameters for the draft lottery application are the coefficients from a regression of Y on Z and D on Z. In our formulation, these are the average intentionto-treat effects under Assumptions 1 and 2. The structural parameter (01) is the average effect of the treatment itself on Y for the subpopulation that complies with assignment. The econometric approach does not distinguish between an effect for the entire population and an effect for the subpopulation of compliers. In our view LATE is structural in the Goldberger (1972) sense of representing a causal link, but not necessarily structural in the sense of representing a parameter that is invariant across populations. Despite this potential lack of generalizability, we. view LATE as interesting (perhaps in combination with the intention-to-treat estimand) because it is an average of unit level causal effects of the treatment of interest. For example, for a potential recruit, the average effect of actual military service for a specific subpopulation is likely to be of greater interest than the population average effect of draft eligibility.
A similar rationale applies to clinical trials, which are often based on populations that are more homogeneous than, and not representative of, the population that will eventually be subjected to the treatment. The presumption in such cases, and in our analysis, is the average over the subpopulation of those whose behavior can be modified by assignment are likely to be informative about population averages of those who comply in the future, even if there is substantial heterogeneity in individual-level causal effects.
It should be stressed, however, that the assumptions needed for a causal interpretation of the instrumental variables estimand (Assumptions 1 and 3-5) are substantially stronger than those needed for the causal interpretation of the intention-to-treat estimand (Assumption 1). The plausibility of the additional assumptions (i.e., the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity assumption) must be taken into account when facing the choice to report estimates of the intention-to-treat estimands, of the IV estimands, or both.
SENSITIVITY OF THE IV ESTIMAND TO CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions laid out in Section 3 are sufficient conditions for the identification of a meaningful average treatment effect. In this section we discuss the sensitivity of the IV estimand to deviations from the IV assumptions. As this discussion makes clear, violations of these assumptions need not be catastrophic. We focus on Assumptions 3 and 5 because they form the core of the IV approach. Assumption 4 (a nonzero average causal effect of Z on D) is conceptually straightforward and easy to check. Assumptions 1 and 2 are standard in the RCM approach, and sensitivity to particular violations of those assumptions has been previously discussed (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). In general the IV estimand is most likely to be sensitive to violations of the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity assumption when there are few compliers. In Section 6 we illustrate how this sensitivity analysis can be applied.
Violations of the Exclusion Restriction
First, we consider violations of the exclusion restriction, while maintaining the other assumptions, stability, and strong monotonicity. If subject i is a noncomplier, that is, Di(O) = Di(I), then the causal effect of Z on Y is The bias relative to the average causal effect of D on Y for compliers, the second term in (15), can also be written as
E[Hi i is a complier] + E[Hi Ii is a noncomplier] P[i is a noncomplier] (16 P[i is a complier]
The first term in the bias in (16) has nothing to do with noncompliance, but is the bias due to the direct effect of assignment for those who take the treatment. If compliance were perfect, the second term would be zero but the first term of the bias would still be present. The increased bias in the IV estimand due to noncompliance is directly proportional to the product of the average size of the direct effect of Z for noncompliers and the odds of noncompliance given monotonicity. The higher the correlation between the instrument and the treatment status (i.e., the "stronger" the instrument), the smaller the odds of noncompliance, and consequently the less sensitive the IV estimand is to violations of the exclusion assumption.
Violations of the Monotonicity Condition
Next we consider violations of the monotonicity assumption. Because we maintain the exclusion restriction, the causal effect of D on Y for person i with Di(1) 7& Di(O) is still uniquely defined, and equal to Yi (1) -Yi (0). Proposition 3. Given stability, the exclusion restriction, and a nonzero average causal effect of Z on D, but without the monotonicity assumption, the IV estimand equals the Local Average Treatment Effect plus a bias term given by (17):
where P(i is a defier) P(i is a complier) -P(i is a defier)
The bias due to violations of monotonicity is composed of two factors. The first factor, A = P(i is a defier)/(P(i is a complier) -P(i is a defier)), is related to the proportion of defiers and is equal to zero under the monotonicity assumption. The smaller the proportion of defiers, the smaller the bias will be from violations of the monotonicity assumption. However, because the denominator of this factor is the average causal effect of Z on D, the bias can be large There is also some evidence that some men with low lottery numbers changed their educational plans so as to retain draft deferments and avoid the conscription (Angrist and Krueger 1992b). If so, then the exclusion restriction could be violated, because draft status may have affected civilian outcomes through channels other than veteran status. We return to this issue in some detail shortly.
Monotonicity would be violated if, for example, someone, who would have volunteered for the Navy when not at risk of being drafted because of a high lottery number, would have chosen to avoid military service altogether when at risk of being drafted because of a low lottery number. It seems unlikely that there were many in the population in this category.
It is clear that the Assumption 4 is satisfied because the likelihood of serving in the military sharply increases with draft status.
Another uncontroversial assumption is the ignorability of treatment assignment, which allows simple unbiased estimation of the average causal effects of Z on D and of Z on Y. Although there is some evidence that the first lottery, which was executed using a poorly designed physical randomization, was not actually random (Fienberg 1971) it nevertheless is almost certainly ignorable. Ignoring this complication and postponing consideration of the possible problems with the exclusion restriction and the monotonicity condition, we forge ahead with the IV approach. Table 2 In columns 5-7, the entries in the third pair of rows give the difference in probability of death, suicide, and veteran status between those with low and high lottery numbers (draft eligible or not). The fourth pair of rows in columns 5 and 6 give the ratio of these differences to the difference in the probability of being veteran by draft eligibility. These are the standard IV estimates. An alternative approach to Angrist (1990) , table 2, and were tabulated using a special version of the SIPP that has been matched to indicators of draft eligibility. Note that probabilities estimated using the SIPP are for the entire country and do not take account of morality. The impact of mortality on differences in the probability of being a veteran by eligibility status is small enough to have only trivial consequences for the estimation. f The standard errors, following econometric practice (e.g. Imbens and Angrist 1994), were calculated based on a normal approximation to the sampling distribution of the ratio of the difference in estimated probability of death/suicide and the difference in estimated probability of serving. We assume independence of numerator and denominator because they were calculated from different data sets. Pooled estimates show a statistically significant increase in risk at conventional significance levels (e.g., Hearst, Newman, Hulley 1986).
The Instrumental Variables Estimates
estimating the local average treatment effect, which takes into account the full implications of the assumptions, is provided in Imbens and Rubin (1994b). As a specific example, consider men born in 1950. Of the men with low lottery numbers (Zi = 1), 35.3% actually served in the military. Of those who had high lottery numbers (Zi = 0), only 19.3% served in the military. Random assignment of draft status suggests that draft status had a causal effect that increased the probability of serving by an estimated 15.9% on average. Similarly, of those with low lottery numbers, 2.04% died between 1974 and 1983, compared to 1.95% of those who had high lottery numbers. The difference of .09% can be interpreted as an estimate of the average causal effect of draft status on civilian mortality. Assuming that these estimated causal effects are population averages, the ratio of these two causal effects of draft status is, under the Assumptions 1-5, the causal effect of military service on civilian mortality for the 15.9% who were induced by the draft to serve in the military. For this group, the average causal effect is .56%, which amounts to approximately a 25% increase in the probability of death (given average mortality rates around 7%). These estimates highlight the fact that the IV estimator does not require observations on individuals; sample averages of outcomes and treatment indicators by values of the instruments are sufficient. In applications like the one discussed here, these moments are drawn from different data sets. (For a detailed discussion of IV estimation with moments from two data sets, see Angrist and Krueger 1992a.) Table 2 should be discounted in light of these findings is unclear. First, there is no evidence of a schooling-lottery number connection for the 1950 cohort, yet lottery-based estimates of the effects of service are even larger for men born in 1950 than for the 1951 cohort used in the illustration. Second, the schoolingmortality connection is not well determined [the Duleep (1986) estimate used here is not actually significantly different from zero], and this relationship is also subject to sign reversals. For example, although men with some college have higher mortality than high school-only graduates, the Duleep study showed almost no difference between the mortality of high school only graduates and college graduates. Thus, a calculation based solely on graduates would indicate no bias.
Sensitivity to the Monotonicity Assumption
Without monotonicity, the average causal effect of Z on D estimates the difference between the proportions of compliers and defiers. In this article we have outlined a framework for causal inference in settings where random assignment has taken place, but compliance is not perfect; that is, the treatment received is nonignorable. In an attempt to estimate the effect of receipt of treatment, rather than assignment of treatment as in intention-to-treat analysis, we make use of instrumental variables. This approach has long been used by economists in the context of regression models with constant treatment effects. We show that this technique can be fit into the Rubin Causal Model and used for causal inference without assuming constant treatment effects. The advantages of embedding this approach in the RCM are twofold. First, it makes the nature of the identifying assumptions more transparent. Second, it allows us to consider the sensitivity of results to deviations from these assumptions in a straightforward manner. We hope that the approach outlined in this article serves to make the IV approach more accessible to statisticians, while helping economists understand and interpret the strong assumptions required for a causal interpretation of IV estimates.
[Received June 1993. Revised December 1995.] Comment James M. ROBINS and Sander GREENLAND We wish to complement the interesting paper by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (AIR) by offering several alternative analytic strategies. We focus on randomized drug treatment trials. In their discussion of noncompliance, AIR focuses on estimating the local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the average effect of treatment in the compliers. In contrast, Robins (1989) focused on estimation of the global average treatment effect (ATE) in the entire study population. Both LATE and ATE differ from the intent-to-treat (ITT) parameter, which is the average effect of treatment assignment. We show that in a typical placebo-controlled trial, all three parameters will equal zero under the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect. We argue that under the alternative, the ATE parameter can be of greater public health interest than the LATE or ITT parameter. We review results of Robins, Manski, and Balke and Pearl on the estimation of the ATE parameter. We show that in trials comparing a new therapy to a standard therapy, the null hypothesis of bioequivalence does not imply the ITT parameter is zero, and thus the ITT parameter is often of no public health interest. We review results on the estimation of the ATE parameter in bioequivalence trials. A common argument in favor of the ITT parameter is that it corresponds to the overall treatment effect that would be realized if the treatment were actually adopted in the community. But this argument assumes that the noncompliance rate observed in the trial would equal the subsequent rate in the community, which may often not be the case. For example, once the treatment is proven to be efficacious in a trial, then nearly all individuals in the community may be willing to stringently comply with the treatment protocol (Robins 1989 ). In such a case, if the study subjects are representative of the community, then the ATE parameter, rather than the ITT or LATE parameter, would correspond to the public health parameter of interest. An advantage of the LATE parameter is that it is identifiable under monotonicity, whereas the ATE parameter is not. But unless no subject in the control arm takes active treatment, the subset of the study population for whom the LATE parameter is the treatment effect (i.e., the compliers) is itself nonidentifiable (AIR 1995). As discussed later, the LATE parameter is not identifiable under more complex noncompliance patterns, even if monotonicity holds.
The distribution of the observed data only determines bounds for the ATE parameter. Assuming Yi dichotomous, . Interestingly, the bounds for the ATEZ parameter do not depend on the monotonicity assumption. Some argue against reporting bounds for nonidentifiable parameters, because bounds are often so wide as to be useless for making public health decisions. But we view the latter problem as a reason for reporting bounds in conjunction with other analyses: Wide bounds make clear that the degree to which public health decisions are dependent on merging the data with strong prior beliefs. Even when the ITT null hypothesis of equality of treatment arm-specific means is rejected, the bounds may appropriately include zero. If treatment benefits some subjects and harms others, the ATE parameter may be zero even though both the sharp and ITT null hypotheses are false. Conversely, the ATE parameter may be nonzero under the ITT null, seriously complicating the interpretation of tests of the ITT null in trials with substantial noncompliance. But there are times that bounds can be quite informative. For example, Balke and Pearl (1993) 
BIOEQUIVALENCE TRIALS A critical difference between a trial with a single active therapy and a bio equivalence trial is that in the pres

CONCLUSION
The ATE parameter can be of greater public health interest than either the LATE or ITT parameter. We have proposed methods for setting bounds and for constructing estimators of the ATE parameter both in single active treatment trials and in bioequivalence trials. Both structural nested models and IPCW estimators can be applied to complex trials with randomized and nonrandomized time-dependent treatments, noncompliance, and dependent censoring with either failure time or repeated-measures outcomes (Robins 1989 (Robins , 1993 2. Contrary to remarks by AIR, econometric work on simultaneous equations allows for variable responses to treatment, does not rely on arbitrary distributional assumptions, develops IV estimation methods for these models, examines the assumptions required to justify IV, and demonstrates that the assumptions required to use IV in the general case are very strong. This analysis is conducted within the context of clearly specified models of outcomes and regime selection that are motivated by behavioral theory. Econometricians make weaker mean independence assumptions rather than the strong independence assumptions made by AIR to identify their parameter.
These assumptions about behavior are very unattractive once they are clearly stated.
4. Econometric policy evaluation is designed to produce many counterfactuals from a common set of behavioral functions. Conditions required to nonparametrically identify this common set of functions are presented in the econometrics literature.
SWITCHING REGRESSION MODELS AND THE "RUBIN MODEL'
Counterfactuals are at the heart of any scientific study. The method of IV has been applied to identify this parameter under general conditions (see Robb 1985, 1986) . Suppose that Z is distinct from X (i.e., does not appear directly in (2) Observe that only mean independence is required-not full independence, as assumed by AIR. AIR are able to test their identifying assumptions because they invoke much stronger conditions than are required to identify their parameter. Minimal identifying assumptions cannot be tested. (Heckman and Robb 1985) . Note further that no arbitrary and untestable monotonicity condition is needed-just a condition that guarantees that the denominator of (5) is not zero for the particular value of X. Parenthetically, monotonicity is not required in classical discrete choice theory either. Also, even in the original dummy endogenous variable analysis it is recognized that the second assumption of AIR's Equation (4) is not needed to apply IV. A central focus in modern econometrics is the development of explicit behavioral models relating the "errors" and choices made by agents. This is critical to developing and justifying any econometric evaluation strategy. Therefore, it is surprising to read in AIR that econometricians do not clearly state assumptions like (A-i)-(A-3) provided that Yl -YO conditional on X is not perfectly forecastable by Z. This is a Granger noncausality condition routinely used in econometrics and explicitly presented in this context by Robb (1985, 1986) . Alternatively, in terms of the "mysterious" unobservables to which AIR object, the condition is: Pr(D = lX, Z, U1-U?) =Pr(D = lX, Z), (6b) provided that U1 -UO conditional on X is not perfectly forecastable by Z. AIR call this non-causality condition "ignorability." If U1 -UO is perfectly forecastable by Z, conditional on X, then (A-2) would be violated.
In general, the extra conditioning on Z causes (A-2) to be violated although it is trivially satisfied only if conditioning is done on X and D. The behavioral assumption justifying (6a) and (6b) requires that the relevant decision makers do not make decisions about which regime is selected using information on the outcomes of the regime that cannot be forecast by X and Z. In most situations, persons making decisions have more information about the outcomes than the statisticians studying them. This makes assumption (6a) or (6b) questionable in such cases.
This assumption is definitely not satisfied in the competing risks model, in the Gronau-Heckman market wagenonmarket wage model, in the Roy model (Heckman and Honore 1990), or in most versions of the switching regressions model. These limitations on the application of the IV method were spelled out by Robb (1985, 1986) and later reiterated by Heckman (1995) . In the switching regression context, they were discussed by Quandt (1988). Although space limitations preclude the full development of the point, IV estimation of LATE requires the same stringent behavioral assumptions.
The draft lottery number cited by AIR as a valid instrument is unlikely to satisfy (A-2) or (A-3) and thus is not likely to be a valid instrument. Consider the application of IV by Angrist (1990) that AIR discuss. The potential outcomes are earnings if persons serve in the military or if they do not. Persons who get a high number are virtually guaranteed that they are exempt from service. Those persons with a high number who nonetheless volunteer to go to the Army perceive a high gain from doing so. If those perceptions are related to the potential outcomes and are based on private information that cannot be fully predicted by X and Z, then the lottery number is not a proper instrument. In addition, persons with high numbers are likely to receive more job training, because their likelihood of being drafted is reduced and firms have less likelihood of losing them. Then Z is an X, and the exclusion assumption is violated. Because of the stringent nature of the required assumptions, most economists have been very cautious about using IV to identify the parameters of switching models. Sometimes, however, application of IV can be justified in the context of heterogeneous treatments. Robinson (1989), using a test proposed by Robb (1985, 1986) , demonstrated that IV methods produce appropriate estimates for estimating the "causal effect" of unions on wages; that is, the union-non-union wage differential. Robinson's evidence is surprising because it indicates that union membership is not based on unobserved components of union wage differentials not predicted by the crude X and Z available to him.
A major difference between the approach taken by AIR and that used by econometricians is that the latter go to much greater depth in justifying the behavioral assumptions that are implicit in the statistical assumptions. It is disappointing to see an entire literature in econometrics that develops explicit models designed to test and justify (A-i)-(A-3), or other identifying assumptions, ignored by AIR in their discussion of the econometrics literature.
IDENTIFICATION UNDER MORE GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR A VARIETY OF PARAMETERS
Heckman and Honore (1989, 1990) presented conditions for identifiability of the full distributions of outcomes in the competing risks and Roy models. Heckman (1990) considered nonparametric identifiability in more general models. Bjorklund and Moffitt (1986) considered estimation of the more general models under specific distributional assumptions. Those authors demonstrate that other methods besides IV estimate behaviorally interesting parameters under more behaviorally plausible conditions. These more general models produce identification of a large array of distinct counterfactuals-a central goal of structural econometric policy evaluation-and do not focus on just one special parameter. In this context, the attempt by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (AIR) to translate IV into terms that may be more understandable by statisticians must be welcomed. AIR translate IV into two frameworks familiar to statisticians. One is the well-known Rubin causal model (RCM). I find this translation to be correct and entirely appropriate, and hope that it is useful to statisticians. The other framework is the intentionto-treat (ITT) framework, with which statisticians are also quite familiar. I find this framework to have advantages as well as disadvantages. On the one hand, the noncompliance problem that is at the heart of the ITT framework is a nice illustration of the econometric problem of "endogeneity" that leads to IV estimation in economics. The notion that the difference in means between experimentals and controls should be inflated by the difference in the percentage treated in the two groups is also common to the ITT and IV frameworks. On the other hand, ITT analysis is conventionally discussed in the context of a randomized clinical trial (RCT), and AIR do so as well. This provides by necessity (3) is one of the models considered in the first attempt at a comprehensive econometric treatment of the causal effects problem by Robb (1985, 1986) . That work was in turn based on the original formulation of the dummy endogenous variable model by Heckman (1978) (on which the Maddala, Bowden-Turkington, and Heckman-Robb papers cited by AIR in Section 2 are based). Although AIR find the use of unobservables in the specification of equations (I)-(3) and the assumptions surrounding it to be nonintuitive, it is important to stress that the model in those equations is nevertheless directly translatable into, and is equivalent to, the Rubin causal model (RCM) with one modification: to allow the treatment effect in equation (1) to vary across individuals; for example, AIR note, the issue is which framework provides the better intuition. Of course, one should not expect economists and statisticians, or even different individuals within each discipline, to find their intuition in the same way, and there is no reason not to have the model translated into multiple frameworks.
Comment
While the constant effect assumption is made in most IV work in economics as a whole, the heterogeneous effect model nevertheless has a long history in certain areas. For example, heterogeneous effects appear in the basic multinomial discrete choice model in relative preferences for different alternatives (McFadden 1974, 1984) . The switching regression model of Heckman (1978) and Lee (1979) , which is closely related to the comparative advantage model of Roy (1951), has heterogeneous response to "regime switching" as a key characteristic. In the treatment effects literature, Robb (1985, 1986) In addition, the military lottery application discussed by AIR is not typical of most IV applications in economics, for most do not involve any explicit randomization. The lottery example is not a pure RCT in any case, because the randomization was based on an intervening variablean individual characteristic (birthdate). Pure RCT's instead randomize individuals directly into experimental and control groups. Consequently, the lottery application requires one additional assumption-birthdate does not directly affect mortality-to satisfy the exclusion restriction and make IV possible. The fact that there are well-known seasonal effects in birth rates (Lam and Miron 1991) that may have a various health-related and socioeconomic antecedents and consequences suggests that the validity of this additional assumption cannot be immediately accepted without further investigation.
A more typical, perhaps even prosaic, economic example, and one that provides an alternative interpretation and source of intuition for IV, is the following. Suppose that we wish to estimate the effect of a job training program on future earnings, and we have data from two different cities on the earnings of men who have and have not gone through job training at some point in the past. Comparing the earnings of trained and untrained workers within each city alone, or pooling the data from both cities and making the same comparison, would yield poor estimates of the effect of training if the untrained workers were different from the trained workers even if they had not gone through training; that is, if there is nonignorable selection bias. But if, say, city A had more funds and offered more training slots than city B, then the fraction of workers who have been trained will be higher in city A than in city B. Consequently, the effect of training could be estimated by regressing mean earnings in each city-the mean taken over trained and untrained workers combined-on the fraction of workers in the city who were trained. The resulting regression coefficient is simply the IV estimate given by AIR in their equation (6) (1)-is just the assumption that there is no direct effect of city of residence on earnings. This assumption would be violated if, for example, the labor market in one city was healthier than that in the other city, which would make earnings different even in the absence of training differences. The monotonicity assumption is just the assumption that everyone who received training in city B would receive training if they resided in city A.
This example provides an alternative interpretation of IV, as simply representing a comparison in a different dimension-in this case, a comparison across cities (i.e., across values of ZJ) instead of a comparison of trained and untrained workers within cities (i.e., across individual values of Di). Expressing the two methods as simply comparisons along different dimensions puts them on a more equal footing and leads to the additional observation that either could be correct or incorrect (or neither could be, of course). The across-city IV comparison would be biased if the allocation of city funds were based on earnings, for example, as noted previously; but, providing that there is no selection of workers into training within each city, a least squares regression that includes a city dummy (i.e., conditions on ZJ) would yield unbiased treatment effect estimates. In the econometric literature, Goldberger (1972) was the first to note this point, showing that if selection into treatment status is based only on an auxiliary variable Zi, then one need only condition on that variable to obtain consistent and unbiased treatment effects (even if the coefficient on that auxiliary variable itself is biased). The later econometric literature clarified the distinction between this case-selection on observables-and the case of selection on unobservables.
Much of the debate in economics involves arguments in specific empirical applications over whether a particular instrument Zi does or does not improve the estimate of treatment effects, given that it can make things worse as well as better. Making such a determination is particularly difficult when it is recognized that no statistical test or specification test can distinguish such models at this simple level. If the two estimates are different, whether one estimate is significantly different from the other can be tested only under the null that one is correct. Although AIR state that IV can be subjected to "sensitivity" testing, the fundamental IV assumptions cannot be tested if they are "just" identifying-that is, if they are a minimal and thus necessary rather than sufficient set of assumptions to obtain treatment effects. (See Heckman and Robb 1986, Heckman and Hotz 1989, and Moffitt 1989 for discussions of this important point.)
The city example provides yet another interpretation of IV, which is as a method of aggregation (Moffitt, 1996) . The IV estimator represents a least squares regression using aggregates taken over Yi and Di within cells of Zi. A related intuition is based on an analysis of variance (ANOVA) analogy, for the IV estimator uses the covariance of Yi and Di "between" cities rather than "within" cities. Indeed, it is easy to show that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of 01 (i.e., the estimate obtained by comparing treatments and comparisons in the total, pooled sample) is a weighted average of the IV (between) estimator and the within estimator:
where k is the fraction of the total variance of D that arises from the "between" and f3W is the treatment effect based on the within variation (i.e., the coefficient on Qi in a regression of Yi on Di and a Zi dummy). The exact decomposition shown in (2) assumes that the sample size is the same in all cities.
The ANOVA analogy can also be used to relate IV to the propensity score method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). In the simple case of a single dummy variable Zi, conditioning on the propensity score is identical to conditioning on Zi and hence is equivalent to the within estimator, Ow. The IV estimator, on the other hand, can be shown to be equivalent to that obtainable by regressing Yi on the propensity score itself; that is, by replacing the treatment dummy Di by the propensity score. (This is the two-stage least squares version of IV.) This yields a treatment effect estimate based on the "between."
1. INTRODUCTION Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (AIR) deserve congratulations for a wonderful paper. Linking econometrics with experimental design, they have illumined both fields. I particularly admire the care they take in defining estimands with few modeling assumptions, in stating assumptions in tangible terms, and in examining the appropriateness and consequences of those assumptions.
In this comtnent, I would like to slightly restate their argument in terms of an artificial example, then generalize the argument to a larger class of estimators (the HodgesLehmann estimators), briefly indicate how one can conduct a sensitivity analysis in a nonrandomized study, and conclude with an observation about the case in which some subjects have unalterable treatment assignments.
AN ARTIFICIAL EXAMPLE: ENCOURAGING EXERCISE FOR LUNG DISEASE
The following artificial example illustrates and restates several of the points made by AIR, but its main purpose is to aid in Section 3 in discussing a generalization of the instrumental variables (IV) estimate. Table 1 describes a randomized experiment with 10 subjects suffering from chronic obstructive lung disease (COLD), of whom 5 were randomly selected and encouraged to exercise. So the randomization determines who was encouraged to exercise; that is, Zi. In fact, not all subjects complied, as indicated by Di (Zi). Subjects 1, 2, and 3 exercised as they were encouraged to do, but subjects 4 and 5 ignored the encouragement and did not exercise. Subject 6 was not encouraged to exercise (Z6 = 0) but did so anyway (D6(0) = 1). The outcome is forced expiratory volume (FEV), a measure of lung function, larger values indicating better health, recorded on a convenient integer scale. The quantity Yi(0) is the outcome that would have been observed from subject i in the absence of exercise. As in AIR's exclusion restriction and in Holland's (1988) discussion of encouragement designs, it is exercise that may have an effect, but encouragement has an effect only if it influences exercise. In Table 1 exercise raises Table 1 where r = 3. In Section 5, it will be seen that the additive model need not hold for all i, that it suffices that additivity holds for subjects who change treatments in response to encouragement, but it is easier to discuss this separately. Write Z, D, Y, and Yo for the N-dimensional vectors of Zi's, Di's, Yi's, and Yi(0)'s. Write M for the number of encouraged subjects, M = ZTZ. In Table 1 Write TM, 'W, and TT for the instrumental HL estimates based on tM, tw, and tT. For the difference in means, simple algebra shows tM(Z,Y -D5-i) = t = 0 if and only if TM is the usual instrumental variable estimator discussed by AIR. If encouragement always determines the treatment so D = Z, then TM is the encouraged minus-control difference in sample means, 'iw is the usual HL estimate associated with the rank sum statistic, and XT is the difference in trimeans. In short, the estimate r generalizes both the usual IV estimate and the usual HL estimate.
In the example in Table 1 , subtracting 3 from each subject who exercised sets all three statistics, tM, tw, and tT, equal to their null expectations, so TM = = XrT = 3 in this particular case. This is exceptional and reflects the perfect balance of the Yi(O)'s in this constructed example. If Y1 in Table 1 were replaced by an extremely large positive value, Table 2 , to test the false hypothesis Ho: T = 1.5 using the rank sum test with an instrumental variable, one computes Y -1.5D = (6.5,5.5,4.5,2, 1,6.5,4,3,2,1) with ranks (9.5,8,7,3.5,1.5,9.5,6,5,3.5, 1.5), so the rank sum is 9.5+8+7+3.5+ 1.5 = 29.5. Allowing for the ties, the null expectation and variance of the rank sum are 27.5 and 22.5 yielding a standardized deviate of (29.5 -27.5) / 22.5 .42, so the hypothesis Ho: T = 1.5 is not rejected. Without ties, the familiar exact distribution of the rank sum statistic may be used.
For instance, in
In short, permutation tests, confidence intervals, and HL estimates all use the null distribution of t(Z, YO), which is the usual randomization distribution (Fisher 1935; Kempthorne 1952, sec. 8.2). If encouragement itself Z had an additive effect, then one would have Yo-Y -Zi-, and the usual procedures for permutation inference would result. What is new with the IV is that exercise D) and not encouragement Z has the additive effect, so the permutation inference is based on Yo Y -DT, but otherwise permutation methods are unchanged. As it turns out, these considerations extend immediately for sensitivity analysis in observational studies.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES IN OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
In the experiment in Table 1 , random assignment of encouragement tended to balance the distribution of Yi(O) in encouraged (Zi = 1) and control (Zi = 0) groups. In an observational study or nonrandomized experiment, subjects might have differing chances of receiving encouragement to exercise; that is, it may be quite wrong to assume that tend to be somewhat higher than those for control (Zi = 0) subjects, and conversely if T* > T. As a consequence, to render the adjusted responses independent of encouragement, one must have the correct T*, and a test statistic such as the rank sum statistic that is consistent when one distribution is stochastically larger than another will, in sufficiently large sample sizes, reject any fixed T* & T, thereby yielding consistent tests, confidence intervals, and point estimates. In short, the procedures in Section 3 describe subjects who comply with no assumptions about those who ignore encouragement.
